Norms and accountability in multi-agent societies by Kibble, Rodger
Norms and accountability in multi-agent
societies
(extended abstract)
Rodger Kibble1
Goldsmiths, University of London, Department of Computing
Lewisham Way, London SE14 6NW, UK
r.kibble@gold.ac.uk
Abstract. It is argued that norms are best understood as classes of
constraints on practical reasoning, which an agent may consult either to
select appropriate goals or commitments according to the circumstances,
or to construct a discursive justification for a course of action after the
event. We also discuss the question of how norm-conformance can be en-
forced in an open agent society, arguing that some form of peer pressure
is needed in open agent societies lacking universally-recognised rules or
any accepted authority structure. The paper includes formal specifica-
tions of some data structures that may be employed in reasoning about
normative agents.
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1 Introduction
Researchers in multi-agent systems have often looked to analytic philosophy
for suitable concepts and theoretical frameworks; indeed it could be said that
philosophers since Aristotle have been engaged in writing specifications for ra-
tional agents. Some influential approaches have included Bratman’s work on
practical reasoning [1] and Austin and Searle’s speech act theories [2,3]. Kib-
ble [4] offered a critique of approaches to ACL semantics based on Speech Act
theory such as FIPA’s ACL [5] and outlined an alternative commitment-based
approach drawing on more recent philosophical studies by Robert Brandom [6,7]
and Joseph Heath [8]. Brandom’s work presents an inferentialist account of the-
oretical and practical reasoning and communication, arguing that mentalist no-
tions such as belief can be dispensed with in favour of more precise notions of
observable practical and propositional commitments (though it turns out that
this term does not seem to have a uniform interpretation among analysts; see
[9] for discussion). Heath works at the frontiers of social theory and analytic
philosophy, developing an account of the interaction of instrumental rational
choice and social norms via a critical engagement with the work of Habermas
[10,11]. Kibble [4] drew on this work with the aim of extending and elaborating
the non-mentalist social commitment model of agency of [12]. Kibble proposed
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an account of agent communication as norm-governed action for an agent to
produce a dialogue act is to take on certain commitments, such as to defend
the content of an assertion if challenged, and other agents are bound to concede
that the agent is entitled to the propositional content of dialogue acts if those
commitments are fulfilled. The present paper continues to build on this work, at-
tempting to reconstruct and/or extend some of Brandom’s and Heath’s proposals
concerning norms, sanctions and commitments in a form that can be applied to
interactions between software agents. The paper is structured as follows:
– Section 2 considers how norms can be maintained by peer pressure rather
than authoritarian structures of command and control, adopting elements of
Heath’s account of social norms;
– Section 3 argues that social norms can be represented as constraints on prac-
tical reasoning, rather than more primitive entities such as goals or commit-
ments;
– Section 4 specifies some data structures to support reasoning about norma-
tive agents, adopting the notation of d’Inverno and Luck’s smart framework
[13].
2 Norms, commitments and sanctions
As with multi-agent research in general, the study of normative agents suffers
from inconsistent use of terminology and lack of consensus on the meaning of
some fundamental terms: what exactly are norms? Assuming agreement can be
reached on some working definitions, one of the questions that then has to be
addressed is: why do (or should) agents conform to norms? There have been
suggestions that failure to honour normative commitments should be subject to
sanctions, but there have been few concrete proposals as to what form these
sanctions might take or who is to be responsible for administering them.
At a certain level of abstraction we can consider norms as solutions to coor-
dination games [14] that cannot be accounted for simply in terms of maximising
utility. Classical game theory models agent interactions as a matrix of the pay-
offs for each agent according to the actions independently chosen by all players
(strategies), and assumes both that the potential payoffs are known in advance
to all players and that they will converge on a “Nash equilibrium” such that
neither player could increase their payoff by changing strategy [15]. Non-trivial
interactions tend to have many such equilibria however, yet the smooth func-
tioning of society relies on some particular solution being commonly accepted,
and thus on agents having some mechanism at their disposal for persuading or
encouraging other agents to stick to the shared rules.
Moving towards the concrete: Brandom [7, 84ff] discusses three classes of
norm involved in practical reasoning: the prudential or instrumental, institu-
tional and unconditional, illustrated in the following examples:
α. Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry, so I will open my um-
brella.
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β. I am a bank employee going to work, so I shall wear a necktie.
γ. Repeating the gossip would harm someone, to no purpose, so I shall
not repeat the gossip.
How would violations of these norms be sanctioned, if at all? In example (α), the
“prudential” norm is a personal preference to stay dry rather than a social norm,
so the only likely “punisher” is Nature rather than any human agent - unless
perhaps the speaker is en route for some event where it would be inappropriate
to turn up with wet hair and soaked clothes. The institutional norm, of wearing
a necktie and being otherwise soberly dressed while working at a bank, is most
likely reinforced by the threat of disciplinary action or even dismissal; minor
violations might only be subject to disapproving comments from co-workers or
clients. Finally, what Brandom refers to as “unconditional” rules about avoiding
unnecessary harm and generally behaving in an ethical and considerate manner
are not subject to institutional sanction: violations might be punished by the
“voice of conscience” or if they became widely known, by expressions of reproach
from friends, family etc. As Heath [8, p. 154] notes, sanctions against violations
of social codes tend to be symbolic, intended to produce feelings of shame and
regret rather than to physically harm or hinder the offender, and to articulate
and re-affirm the norm.
Carrying across these distinctions into normative multi-agent systems will
not be straightforward: for one thing we can safely assume that software agents
are not subject to feelings of shame. Lopez y Lopez et al [16] for example use
“norm” as an umbrella term encompassing “obligations, prohibitions, commit-
ments and social codes”, which would appear to fall under Brandom’s headings
of “institutional” and “unconditional”. My approach proceeds from rather dif-
ferent assumptions:
Norms vs goals: The core of the definition of norms offered by [16] is a
set of normative goals which specify “something that ought to be done”. I will
argue in the next section for a clear distinction between goals and norms, the
latter being concerned with how goals are to be achieved and how the actions
taken to achieve them can be justified.
Institutional vs bottom-up norms: The emphasis in [16] is on institu-
tional norms, namely obligations and permissions, which are taken by [13] to
be the only species of norm whose violation is punishable. Social commitments
are stipulated to have rewards for compliance but no punishments for violation,
while social codes have neither. Of the four different categories of artificial soci-
ety described by [17], institutional norms are appropriate for closed, semi-closed
and semi-open societies, where it is feasible to have commonly accepted rules and
“enforcer” agents whose authority is universally recognised. With the growing
potential for agent applications in open environments such as the Semantic Web,
I suggest that this approach needs to be supplemented by considering whether
and how norms can be sustained “horizontally” without assuming the existence
of legislators, enforcers and so on.
A particular issue for MAS is indeed how norms can be enforced in open en-
vironments where norm-conformant agents interact with instrumentally rational
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agents. The main lacuna is probably in the area of sanctions: for an agent to be
socially committed entails that failure to redeem the commitment will be sub-
ject to sanction, but the literature contains few concrete proposals on the precise
nature of the appropriate penalties (though Walton and Krabbe [18, pp. 20, 184]
offer some tentative suggestions). Brandom proposes sanctions for nonfulfilment
of a commitment [6, p. 163] though apparently not for arbitrarily withdrawing
commitments [7, p. 93], and no specific sanctions are specified for failure to hon-
our propositional commitments. A more recent proposal [19] defines violation
criteria for specified types of commitment and assigns fixed numerical penal-
ties for violations. However, the authors are silent on how these numbers might
translate into effective punishments that could hinder the offending agents, and
on what protocols or structures of authority could be involved in the application
of sanctions.
The approach taken in this paper is influenced by Heath’s discussion of social
norms [8, pp. 150-161], which itself draws on the work of Durkheim and Talcott
Parsons (see Heath op. cit. for references). The key ideas are:
– sanctions serve to penalise deviance in the sense of prioritising instrumental
considerations over norms;
– norm-conformant agents are characterised not only by being disposed to
follow norms themselves but by “the disposition to punish those who do
not” [8, p. 155, emphasis in original];
– agents which are not norm-conformant by design will thus have instrumental
reasons to follow norms;
– prior to being sanctioned, agents may receive the opportunity to “give an
account” of their reasons for action, as it may not always be evident whether
an aberrant action results from deliberate deviance, dissent (adherence to a
different set of norms from the majority) or misunderstanding (op. cit., p.
160).
Kibble [4] proposed that agents have the following options for penalising breaches
of communicative norms:
– ostracism: the offending agent is notified that its messages will not be ac-
cepted for a specified time period, or until it performs the requested justifi-
catory speech act;
– blacklisting : the complaining agent may broadcast details of the offence to
trusted agents, which may decide to implement sanctions themselves.
These penalties could in principle be generalised to other instances of norm vio-
lations. For example in an e-commerce environment, temporary exclusion from
the market-place would be a highly effective sanction against dubious business
practices. Furthermore, if the penalties are imposed for a fixed time period, the
duration of the time period could be determined according to the numerical cal-
culations described by [19]. For an agent to choose to conform to a norm assumes
either that they are designed with the capacity to recognise and reason about
normative behaviour, or that their human principals may realise that something
is going wrong and decide to re-engineer or replace their agent software.
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3 Norms as constraints on reasoning
The principal claim I want to argue for in this section is that a norm is not simply
a goal or commitment (including negative goals, i.e. prohibitions) but a set of
criteria to enable agents to select an appropriate goal or adopt an appropriate
commitment according to the circumstances. To take a fairly stark example,
most religious and ethical systems include a precept against killing, yet also
tolerate the taking of life in certain defined situations: self-defence, as a soldier
in a “just war”, as a policeman dealing with a life-threatening situation and so
on. So the applicable norm in such systems is not simply a prohibition, Do not
kill, it is a class of licit inference patterns leading to a conclusion Do not kill or
You may kill according to the circumstances1.
Another way of looking at things is to adopt a discursive account of goals
and norms: instead of considering their role in determining an agent’s actions,
we may consider how they can be invoked after the event to account for the
actions. From this point of view we can make quite a clean separation:
– explanations of an action or course of actions will make reference to the
agent’s goals, perhaps supplemented by a sequence of means-end reasoning.
– justifications of an action additionally need to refer to norms: goals alone
cannot justify an action, since the legitimacy of the goals themselves as well
as the means employed to achieve them may be at issue.
For example, there is an apocryphal tale of a career criminal who was asked
why he kept robbing banks and replied, “That’s where the money is”. This may
count as an explanation of goal-directed action, but not as a justification. If
he had said something like, “The banks destroyed my livelihood by foreclosing
the mortgage on the family farm”, this could be understood as an appeal to an
intelligible normative framework.
We could also express this distinction by saying that goals give rise to com-
mitments to actions, while norms give rise to (claimed) entitlements to those
commitments. In fact an underlying theme of this section is the relation be-
tween norms and responsibility, in the sense of the following statements:
judgement and action . . . are in a distinctive sense what we are respon-
sible for. They express commitments of ours . . . [7, p. 80]
Accountability . . . captures two related aspects of the structure of norm-
governed action, namely, that agents can be called upon to justify their
actions vis-a-vis the relevant norms. . . and that they can be sanctioned
for failure to comply with the prevailing normative expectations. . . [8,
pp. 151-2]
1 Of course, there are certain communities such as Quakers or Jains for whom the
inference would be somewhat vacuous, in that the conclusion would invariably forbid
killing.
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The previous section discussed the second sense of accountability; here we are
concerned with the first. Before proceeding further I wish to depart from Bran-
dom’s terminology in one respect. He uses the term “prudential norm” where I
prefer to speak of instrumental preferences, reserving the term norm for social
norms, where other agents’ expected behaviour plays a part in deciding whether
or not to conform. With reference to example α above, the speaker doubtless
prefers to avoid getting wet whether or not anyone else will ever know about it.
Having established this distinction, I propose that an action can be considered
as norm-conformant if an agent called to account for the action is barred from
offering a purely instrumental explanation. This ties in with the observation in
section 2 that a norm is a solution to a coordination game which cannot be
specified purely in terms of maximising payoffs.
The notion of accountability establishes a link between action and communi-
cation: various researchers in MAS have followed [20,18] in treating agent com-
munications as actions that express or give rise to commitments: an agent can
be said to be privately committed to the truth of a proposition, or publicly
committed to producing an argument supporting the proposition if challenged.
(A strictly non-mentalist account would only admit the second of these senses.)
Likewise, we can say that an agent who has adopted a goal is privately commit-
ted to a course of action, and executing the action creates a public commitment
on the agent to justify it if challenged, or to demonstrate entitlement to a set of
goals and actions.
Brandom [7] stresses the inescapably non-monotonic nature of practical rea-
soning: in examples α - γ, the conclusion could be invalidated by an additional
premise. For instance if we accept β as a good inference, the following variant
β′ may still be classed as bad:
β′ I am a bank employee going to work, and today is Dress-down Friday,
so I shall wear a necktie.
The implication is that in the above examples of practical reasoning, the partic-
ular norm being invoked cannot simply be filled in as a missing premise: dress
soberly when working at a bank, do not cause undeserved harm etc, but rather
defines a particular class of inference patterns. Using explicitly normative termi-
nology such as “employees should wear neckties” serves to express endorsement
of particular patterns of inference:
Different patterns of inferences should be understood as corresponding
to different sorts of norms or pro-attitudes. [7, p.90]
The most general or abstract way to define a norm is thus as a subset of the set
of inferences available to an agent according to its propositional vocabulary and
reasoning capabilities.
4 Data structures for reasoning about normative agents
This section outlines some data structures, at a fairly high level of abstraction,
which could be employed in reasoning about the actions and commitments of a
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normative agent, either by observing its behaviour and utterances or by directly
querying it about the reasons for its actions. We begin by adopting some notation
from d’Inverno and Luck’s smart framework [13] in the hope that this will
facilitate comparison with more established approaches.
4.1 Basic definitions
I will follow d’Inverno and Luck up to the definition of an Agent, after which
there will be some divergence.
The framework includes the following primitive types, where Attribute is the
type of basic facts about the world:
[Attribute,Action]
Entities are not taken as primitives, but as bundles of attributes. What fol-
lows is a simple example of a Z schema [21], comprising a name (Entity), a
section where variables are declared (the signature) and a property section.
Entity
attributes : PAttribute
attributes 6= ∅
The Environment, Env is defined as some non-empty set of Attributes:
Env == P1Attribute
An Object an Entity capable of Actions. The notation here says that the
Object schema includes the specifications of the Entity schema and extends it
with additional statements.
Object
Entity
capabilities : Actions
capabilities 6= ∅
Objects do not have their own goals, so only act in furtherance of goals im-
posed from outside. If an Object is endowed with goals, it becomes or instantiates
an Agent:
Goal == P1Attribute
Agent
Objects
goals : PGoal
goals 6= ∅
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4.2 Definitions for norm-conformant agents
In order to be able to talk about the reasoning capacities of normative agents, I
define a few new types.
A Proposition is a bundle of attributes which may or may not be true in a given
situation. It appears that a Proposition is denotationally equivalent to an Entity,
but they will be differentiated by their different roles in agent schemas.
Proposition == P1Attribute
An Inference is an ordered triple involving an Environment, a set of Propositions
constituting the premises of an argument, and a Proposition as the conclusion.
Inference == (Env × PProposition × Proposition)
Inferences == P Inference
If we observe an Agent carrying out Inferences, we may call it a RationalAgent.
RationalAgent
Agent
inferences : Inferences
inferences 6= ∅
As argued in the previous section, norms are essentially constraints on inferences,
thus they delimit the class of logically possible inferences an agent may carry
out. A simple way to represent this is to define the norms which an agent adheres
to as a subset of the inferences of which it is capable.
NormativeAgent
RationalAgent
norms : Inferences
norms 6= ∅
norms ⊆ inferences
This basic framework will of course need to be extended in various ways, in
particular to model the sharing of norms within an agent society.
5 Conclusions
This extended abstract has considered normative agency in terms of the ac-
countability of agents, where (following [8]) agents can be held accountable for
their actions by being sanctioned for deviant behaviour, or by being required
to give an account of the reasons and justifications for the action. The account
has drawn on recent work in linguistic and social philosophy by Brandom and
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Heath. I have proposed a clear distinction between norms and goals, charac-
terising norms as constraints on reasoning which govern both the selection of
appropriate goals and their justification after the event. The discussion has been
conducted in rather general terms, though I have tried to indicate how it could
be made more precise with the aid of the smart framework. Future work will
aim to extend this formalisation, in the hope that this will not only inform the
design of normative software agents but can feed back into the philosophical
arena by sharpening up the conceptual framework.
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